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Italy’s	election:	The	path	to	political	radicalisation
The	success	of	the	Five	Star	Movement	and	Lega	in	Italy’s	election	was	a	shock	for	many	observers
across	Europe.	Roberto	Orsi	writes	that	the	country	is	now	on	a	path	toward	further	political
radicalisation,	driven	by	the	failures	of	previous	Italian	political	leaders	and	discontent	at	wider
processes	of	globalisation.
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The	result	of	the	Italian	general	election	was	extraordinary.	Even	if	the	most	recent	polls	had	anticipated	the	trend,
the	actual	numbers	were	surprising,	providing	the	immediate	sense	of	a	rather	dramatic	political	shift.	Three	main
and	tightly	interconnected	stories	are	easily	detectible:	the	irresistible	rise	of	the	Five	Star	Movement	(M5S),	the
decisive	victory	of	the	Northern	League	under	Matteo	Salvini’s	leadership,	and	the	collapse	of	Matteo	Renzi’s
Democratic	Party	(PD).
The	Five	Star	Movement	became	the	first	party	with	more	than	32%	of	the	votes,	up	from	24%	in	2013,	with	a	margin
of	14	points	above	second	place.	This	was	a	staggering	result.	Although	the	M5S	was	expected	to	gain	up	to	29%,
achieving	32%	makes	it	one	of	the	largest	political	parties	in	Europe.	The	(ex-Northern)	League	achieved	well	over
17%,	by	far	its	highest	result	ever.	While	the	party	started	off	as	the	representative	of	Northern	Italy’s	interests,
grievances,	and	political	positions,	Salvini’s	bid	to	transform	it	into	a	nation-wide	political	force	on	the	model	of
France’s	Front	National	has	clearly	paid	off.	The	Democratic	Party	(PD),	which	has	ruled	Italy	with	minor	allies	over
the	2013-2018	period,	suffered	a	crushing	defeat,	decreasing	from	29%	in	2013	(and	40%	at	the	2014	European
elections)	to	a	meagre	19%.
As	a	sideshow,	one	can	see	the	decline	of	Berlusconi,	whose	Forza	Italia	party	lags	far	behind	its	League	ally.
Considering	that	Berlusconi	is	now	81,	it	is	unlikely	he	will	continue	to	be	involved	in	active	politics	for	much	longer,
and	it	is	questionable	whether	his	party	can	survive,	and	how,	without	its	founder	or	more	precisely,	its	owner.
It	is	not	just	the	numbers	that	matter,	but	also	their	geographic	distribution.	The	Northern	regions	where	most	of	the
economic	production	is	concentrated,	namely	those	with	a	massive	fiscal	surplus	supporting	the	rest	of	the	country,
are	dominated	by	the	League.	The	South	has	been	instead	almost	totally	conquered	by	the	M5S,	with	percentages
ranging	between	40%	and	60%.	The	traditional	strongholds	of	the	PD	in	central	Italy	have	collapsed,	with	only	the
territories	around	Florence	and	Bologna	as	the	last	notable	exceptions.	The	PD’s	defeat	in	the	South	is	beyond
belief.	The	M5S	and	the	League,	both	labelled	as	“populist”,	anti-establishment,	xenophobic,	anti-EU,	and	actively
opposed	for	years	by	almost	the	totality	of	the	mainstream	media,	academics,	and	intellectuals,	now	control	around
half	of	the	electorate.	Any	containment	strategy	against	them	has	failed.	Why	is	that	so?
LSE European Politics and Policy (EUROPP) Blog: Italy’s election: The path to political radicalisation Page 1 of 4
	
	
Date originally posted: 2018-03-09
Permalink: http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2018/03/09/italys-election-the-path-to-political-radicalisation/
Blog homepage: http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/
Factors	leading	to	Renzi’s	defeat
The	outcome	of	the	election	was	determined	primarily	by	the	policies	of	uncontrolled	mass	immigration	which	started
in	2014	under	Enrico	Letta	and	continued	under	Renzi	and	Paolo	Gentiloni.	These	have	de	facto	turned	Italy	into	a
giant	camp	for	asylum	seekers,	generating	a	sense	of	societal	breakdown	and	acute	political	conflict.	The	rejection	of
such	policies	is	the	single	most	important	factor	explaining	the	collapse	of	the	PD	as	well	as	the	rise	of	the	League,
and	the	only	factor	which	can	reasonably	explain	the	deep	penetration	of	the	League	in	Central	Italy	(Rome:	10%;
Macerata:	20%;	Perugia:	17%;	L’Aquila:	17%),	not	to	mention	the	incredible	5%	attained	in	Palermo.
The	second	most	important	factor	is	the	socio-economic	crisis	which	continues	despite	a	period	of	mild	economic
growth	starting	from	the	end	of	2015.	While	such	recovery	is	confirmed	by	all	available	data,	it	remains	quite	modest
in	comparison	to	the	economic	pain	of	the	2009-2014	period.	It	also	appears	to	be	concentrated	in	some	areas	of	the
country	(particularly	the	North-East,	which	has	voted	en	masse	for	the	League)	and	in	certain	strata	of	the
population,	while	the	South	has	remained	in	a	troubling	socio-economic	condition.	Renzi’s	hyperbolic	triumphalism
over	such	a	modest	recovery	despite	widespread	suffering	in	most	of	the	country,	and	hostility	towards	a	ruling	class
which	is	perceived	as	corrupt,	self-absorbed,	self-referential,	and	obsessed	with	fashionable	but	marginal	issues,
have	propelled	the	M5S	to	its	current	position.
Italy	in	the	international	context
The	result	of	the	Italian	election	and	the	dynamics	leading	to	it	fall	squarely	in	the	context	of	a	change	common	to	all
European	and	Western	politics.	After	the	end	of	the	Cold	War	and	with	the	onset	of	a	unipolar,	globalised
international	landscape,	a	new	Euro-Atlantic	political	and	intellectual	elite	has	emerged.	This	elite	is	internationalised,
urban,	sophisticated,	“trendy”,	and	solidly	in	control	of	mainstream	communication.	They	regard	nation	states	as	a
relic	of	the	past	while	conceptualising	countries,	in	a	post-modernist	fashion,	fundamentally	as	platforms	for	global
governance.	They	make	little	distinction	between	citizens	and	non-citizens,	and	place	large	emphasis	on	the
individual,	individual	rights,	de-territorialisation	and	geographic	mobility,	while	downplaying	collectivities	(unless	they
are	ethnic	or	religious	minorities)	and	continuity	with	the	past	of	the	political	community,	even	when	they	are
nominally	conservative.
It	should	be	noted	that	these	ideas	have	extremely	limited	penetration	in	the	rest	of	the	world,	thus	not	being	at	all
really	“global”	in	a	proper	sense.	In	the	past	two	decades,	such	ideological	constructs	have	decisively	moved	the
centre	of	political	discourse	and	action	towards	identity	politics.	In	2015,	this	conception	of	the	world	and	of	politics
peaked	with	the	disaster	of	Merkel’s	immigration	policies,	as	well	as	the	immense	propagandistic	effort	aimed	at
legitimising	them,	with	the	active	involvement	of	almost	all	Western	intellectuals.	The	upfront	adoption	of	policies
which	in	no	way	can	be	regarded	as	sound	and	sustainable	for	anybody	who	has	a	minimal	understanding	of
historical	and	political	dynamics,	as	became	clear	in	a	matter	of	months,	led	to	a	dramatic	loss	of	credibility	for	the
ruling	classes,	institutions,	the	media,	and	intellectuals.
Since	2015,	the	West	has	found	itself	in	a	transition	period	in	which	such	elites	and	their	ideological	constructions	are
suffering	a	series	of	grave	defeats	in	pitched	battles	caused	by	the	sky-high	levels	of	political	polarisation	they
themselves	have	created.	Brexit	and	Trump,	alongside	numerous	European	elections	that	have	featured	the
disappearance	or	deep	crisis	of	traditional	parties,	particularly	on	the	left	(as	in	France,	or	the	German	SPD),	as	well
as	the	ascent	of	the	AfD	in	Germany,	and	the	rise	of	the	Visegrád	group	and	even	Austria	as	centres	of	political
contestation,	are	the	most	immediate	symptoms	of	a	disintegration	of	political	consensus.
Italy’s	election	is	just	another	episode	in	this	sequence.	Renzi	and	his	entourage	could	not	see	and	possibly	even
imagine	that	allowing	unlimited,	unregulated	mass	immigration	would	destroy	the	bulk	of	popular	consent	for	himself
and	his	party.	His	worldview	simply	did	not	seem	to	be	compatible	with	contemplating	this	possibility.	He	could	not
even	see,	as	Merkel	did,	that	by	practicing	such	policies	he	was	further	undermining	any	sense	of	solidarity	within	the
European	Union,	on	which	he	and	the	country	at	large	is	paradoxically	dependent,	both	politically	and	economically.
Furthermore,	he	could	not	realise	that	the	wholesale	importation	of	obsessive	US	political	discourses	on	race	and
gender	into	a	completely	different	society	such	as	Italy	would	have	met	fierce	resistance,	particularly	when	the
problems	for	the	overwhelming	majority	of	the	population	are	systematically	sidelined	or	ignored.
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Renzi’s	faults	are	not	simply	mistakes	or	errors,	his	defeat	is	the	consequence	of	a	cognitive	tunnel,	the	iron	cage	of
group-think	and	echo-chambers	in	which	Euro-Atlantic	elites	have	put	themselves.	It	is	all	too	natural	indeed	that	the
few	places	where	the	PD	retains	a	sizeable	electorate	are	the	still	wealthy,	idyllic	centres	of	Rome,	Milan,	Turin,
Florence	and	a	few	other	major	cities.	The	PD	has	been	defeated	despite	open	support	from	the	overwhelming
majority	of	mainstream	media	and	intellectuals	(who	reside	in	above	mentioned	areas),	a	common	pattern	across	the
West	(for	instance	in	Hillary	Clinton’s	defeat	in	2016).
It	is	difficult	to	envisage	any	remedy	for	this	trend.	The	ideas	making	up	the	ideological	landscape	wherein	leaders
like	Renzi	or	Merkel	think	and	act	are,	simply	put,	flawed.	In	many	ways	the	current	crumbling	of	the	ideological
structure	of	the	Euro-Atlantic	world	has	similarities	with	the	collapse	of	Marxism-Leninism	in	the	1980s	in	Central	and
Eastern	Europe.	Marxism-Leninism	was	not	an	unreasonable	approach	to	political	and	economic	problems	in	its
heyday.	There	were	“good	reasons”,	so	to	say,	for	its	existence	in	historical	terms.	Nevertheless,	its	genetic	defects
quickly	became	all	too	evident	and	by	the	1980s	it	was	an	overhauled	ideology,	even	if	very	few	of	its	exponents	and
intellectuals	could	see	it.	In	all	likelihood,	the	decline	of	Renzi’s	and	Merkel’s	ideological	worldview	will	continue	given
its	fundamental	unsustainability,	even	though	one	cannot	expect	them	or	those	who	think	through	the	same
ideological	lenses	to	recognise	this	point,	leading	to	the	futility	and	even	undesirability	of	political	dialogue.
What	happens	next?
The	parliamentary	landscape	in	the	aftermath	of	the	election	is	so	fragmented	that	no	obvious	path	exists	for	forming
a	government.	According	to	the	constitution,	President	Sergio	Mattarella	will	indicate,	after	consultations	with	all
political	parties,	a	possible	candidate	for	the	post	of	prime	minister.	This	candidate	will	then	need	to	have	their	own
consultations	in	order	to	seek	a	majority	in	the	Parliament.
In	case	the	attempt	is	unsuccessful,	the	President	can	indicate	new	candidates,	until	either	a	majority	is	formed,	or,	if
there	is	no	chance	to	have	one,	new	elections	are	called.	In	theory,	the	first	candidate	should	be	Matteo	Salvini,	as
leader	of	the	centre-right	coalition	(with	Berlusconi’s	Forza	Italia	and	minor	allies),	which	has	gained	most	votes.	The
coalition	does	not	have	sufficient	numbers	in	the	Parliament,	and	it	would	require	the	votes	of	MPs	from	other
formations.	It	is	unclear	who	these	could	be.	Alternatively,	a	League-M5S	alliance	without	Berlusconi,	although	it
could	make	sense	from	the	perspective	of	political	programmes,	looks	very	unlikely.	New	elections	in	the	next	few
months	remain	a	very	plausible	outcome.
From	a	broader	perspective,	this	election	may	have	marked	the	beginning	of	a	wholly	new	and	rather	worrying
political	phase	for	the	Italian	state.	Given	the	fact	that	the	M5S	completely	dominates	the	South,	any	attempt	at
sidelining	it	effectively	amounts	to	the	sidelining	of	the	entire	South.	The	North	is	dominated	by	the	League.	North
and	South	are	diverging	more	and	more	to	the	point	of	having	now	starkly	different	political	systems,	to	an
unprecedented	degree.
While	both	parties	have	been	very	effective	in	capturing	the	acute	discontent	in	both	areas,	they	also	run	the	risk	of
disappointing	their	voters.	These	are	unlikely	to	return	to	moderate,	centrist	options,	as	moderates	are	by	definition
those	who	are	satisfied	by	the	status	quo	and	desire	only	limited	changes,	but	there	is	no	realistic	end	in	sight	for
social	and	economic	pain	in	Italy	considering	the	complexity	and	the	systemic	character	of	the	crisis.	The	country	is
on	a	“natural	course”	towards	radicalisation.	The	forcing	of	yet	another	round	of	inconclusive	centrism	by	the
President	with	EU	support	will	most	likely	only	accelerate	this	trend.
Please	read	our	comments	policy	before	commenting.
Note:	This	article	gives	the	views	of	the	author,	not	the	position	of	EUROPP	–	European	Politics	and	Policy	or	the
London	School	of	Economics.
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